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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina cases on the subject.9 The cases heretofore have held
that the important factor in determining the materiality of a representa-
tion is whether it is one that would have influenced the company in
deciding the important questions of accepting the risk and fixing the
premium rate.
FRANKLIN T. DUPREE, JR.
JMortgages-Corporations---Removal of Trustees under
Security Deeds of Trust.
The defendant was named as trustee in a Georgia real estate mort-
gage securing a number of bonds. Thereafter the holders of ninety-two
per cent of these bonds filed a petition in the Georgia court praying the
defendant's removal from the trusteeship on the grounds that he was
insolvent, that he had misappropriated trust funds committed to his
care, that he had been convicted of a fraudulent breach of trust, and
that for other reasons he was not a suitable person to act as trustee.
Service was by publication. The lower court ruled that the action was
properly brought. Held, by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the action
should have been dismissed, since, inter alia, the proceeding was in
personam, and service by publication was insufficient to give the court
jurisdiction.'
Contrary to a proposition advanced by the court in its opinion,
2 it
has been quite generally conceded that, even in the absence of statutory
authority,3 the equity court's inherent supervisory power over all trusts
includes the power, in a proper case, to remoye an unfit mortgage trus-
tee.4 In the situation which is perhaps most analagous in so far as the
'Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906) ; Gardner v.
North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 79 S. E. 806 (1913).
'Caldwell v. Hill, 176 S. E. 381 (Ga. 1934).
2176 S. E. at 382-385.
2 Quite commonly statutes now -provide a procedure for the removal of trus-
tees. The grounds for removal are also stated in many. For example, KAN. REv.
STAT. (1923) Ch. 67-412: "Trustees having violated or attempting to violate any
express trust, or becoming insolvent, or of whose solvency or that of their sureties
there is reasonable doubt, or for other cause, in the discretion of the court having
jurisdiction, may, on petition of any person interested, after hearing, be removed
by such court; and all such vacancies in express trusteeships may be filled by such
court." These provisions are applicable to mortgage trusteeships. Sanders v.
Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). The North Carolina statute, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2583 (a), provides for removal by vote of a majority
of the note or -bondholders, -when the trustee has removed from the state, become
a bankrupt, or, if corporate, ceased to do business, etc. This provision, however,
is expressly stated to be "in addition to the rights and remedies now -provided by
law." §2583, as amended, Public Laws 1933, c. 493, provides for a proceeding
before the clerk for the appointment of a successor where the trustee has absented
himself or become otherwise incompetent.
'4 TiompsoN, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) §2667. On the removal of trustees
generally see 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) §275 et seq.
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point here considered is concerned, i.e., the trusteeship under the usual
corporate mortgage, 5 this proposition has rarely been brought to ques-
tion. The court, though reluctant6 to alter a situation which the parties
by their contract have created, will, nevertheless, remove a mortgage
trustee when, in the exercise of a sound discretion, this expedient is
necessary to a proper administration of the trust. A mere innocent
'breach of duty, however, though subjecting the trustee to liability for
the damage caused thereby, will not justify his removal in the absence
of evidence that such a course will result in some substantial benefit to
the estate. 7 It must be shown that the trustee has become an incom-
petent person to execute the trust, either because of some personal dis-
ability, or because he has placed himself in a position antagonistic to the
interests of the bondholders whom he represents. Insolvency,8 perma-
nent absence from the state,0 collusion with the mortgagor,' 0 willful
breach of duty,": refusal to execute the trust upon proper demand be-
Though the mortgagor was an individual in this case, the situation presented
is comparable to that of the corporate mortgage in that the indenture was executed
to secure an issue of coupon bonds rather than, as is the usual case with an indi-
vidual's mortgage, one or a few promissory notes. Consequently the cases con-
sidered herein deal, in the main, with corporate mortgages.
6 "It is generally a difficult thing to induce a court to remove a trustee. A court
of equity has the power to do so, but will not regularly use that power." 4 CooK,
CoxpoaATioNs (8th ed. 1923) §819.
'Matthews v. Murchison, 17 Fed. 760 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1883). In Connover
v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1918), the indenture pro-
vided that the bonds 'were to be secured by mortgages assigned and transferred
to the trustee by the issuing corporation. The trustee accepted the corporation's
own mortgages executed to itself. This was held to be beyond the authority of
the trustee, consequently it was liable to the bondholders for any damages which
might accrue, but the court refused to remove the trustee. There was no bad
faith on its part, and "the trustee is a responsible banking institution .... The
removal of a trustee is a matter directed to the sound discretion of a court; in
the absence of bad faith upon the part of a trustee, he should not be removed
unless some benefits to the trust can be accomplished by such removal."
'Insolvency does not ipso facto terminate the trust. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F.
(2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) ; Mitchell v. Shuford, 200 N. C. 321, 156 S. E. 513
(1930). But it has long been recognized as a ground for removal, whether the
trustee be an individual or a corporation. Iowa & Cal. Land Co. v. Hoag, 132 Cal.
627, 64 Pac. 1073 (1901) ; Reynolds v. New York Security & T. Co., 88 Hun 569,
34 N. Y. S. 890 (1895), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 689, 51 N. E. 1092 (1898) ; Clay v. Shela
Valley Irr. Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141 (1896). This is usually contained in
the statutes providing for removal of trustees, see note 3 supra. If the trustee
is no more than a bare stakeholder for the security, with no active duties to per-
form, the court in its discretion might properly refuse to remove him upon the
grounds of insolvency alone.
'Ketchum v.'Mobile & 0. R. Co., 2 Woods 532, Fed. Cas. No. 7, 737 (C. C.
S. D. Ala. 1876); 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §2296; cf. Ettlinger v.
Schumacher, 142 N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 (1894) (holder of corporate bonds per-
mitted to foreclose when trustee beyond the jurisdiction and unobtainable) ; Wash-
ington Etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria Etc. R. R. Co., 19 Gratt. 592, 100 Am. Dec.
710 (Va. 1870).
10 Matter of Mechanics' Bank, 2 Barb. 446 (N. Y. Supreme Ct. 1848).
"' North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 81 N. C. 223 (1879) (trustee lent sink-
ing fund money to a banking firm of 'which he was a member in violation of the
provisions of the indenture).
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ing made,' 2 or any other fact showing the trustee to be incompetent will
suffice. As this relief may be preventative as well as remedial, the
trustee should be removed where he has placed himself in such a posi-
tion that future injury may accrue to the trust therefrom. Thus where,
at the time of foreclosure, the same party occupies the trusteeship
under both prior and junior mortgages, he should be displaced from
one or the other to obviate future embarrassment which may result from
conflicts between the interests which he represents. 13 "Public policy
requires, where controversies are brought into court, that each party
should be represented by someone whose single object it is to secure all
to which such party is entitled, unhampered by personal relations to an
adverse party.
' '14
A method of removal and substitution of trustees is frequently pro-
vided in the mortgage itself. Though the parties by their contract may
not entirely deprive the court of its jurisdiction in this regard,15 these
provisions are generally upheld,16 and an appointment made in com-
pliance therewith will not be disturbed by the court except to correct
some obvious abuse.17 Thus where the power of removal and substi-
tution is given to the majority of the bondholders under a corporate
"Harrison v. Union Trust Co., 144 N. Y. 326, 39 N. E. 353 (1895) (removal
granted where trustee refused to convey property when ordered to do so by fore-
closure decree).
' Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 70 Fed. 423 (S. D. N. Y.
1895) ; Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270 Pa. 199, 112 Atl.
871 (1921). Contra: Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 55 Fed. 445 (C. C. E. D.
Va. 1893) (trustee held under twelve different mortgages on the same railroad
system; bondholders committee was denied the right to intervene in foreclosure
proceedings in the absence of a positive showing of negligence or inability to
represent their interests upon the part of the trustee).
"4Kephart, J., in Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270
Pa. 199, 112 Atl. 871, 872 (1921). Some of the decisions, however, have displayed
a reluctance to remove the trustee or to allow intervention by bondholders merely
because of some mutual interest existing between trustee and mortgagor, majority
bondholders committee, etc. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Virginia Passenger &
Power Co., 132 Fed. 921 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1904) (trustee corporation and mort-
gagor corporation controlled by the same group); Continental & C. Trust & S.
Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 Fed. 600 (E. D. Wis. 1912) (trustee "co perat-
ing" with a combination to reorganize the mortgagor company) ; Fidelity Trust
Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 588 (W. D. Wash. 1914) (trustee's
position as depositary for bonds under reorganization agreement not grounds for
removal) ; McPherson v. Commercial Bldg. & Securities Co., 206 Iowa 562, 218
N. W. 306 (1928) (trustee indirectly interested in protection of directors of
mortgagor and will not proceed as "aggressively" as would bondholder).
Cf. Wright v. Pitts, 62 App. D. C. 217, 66 F. (2d) 197 (1933).
s' JONES, 10c. cit. supra note 9. Cf. Fletcher v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 39 Vt. 633
(1858) (statute, passed after the execution of the mortgage, which in effect
nullified power of appointment was in violation of the contract clause of the
United States Constitution) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hughes, 11 Hun 130
(N. Y. Supreme Ct. 1877) (former trustee enjoined from bringing actions as
trustee after removal).
I However, the court will be very reluctant to disregard the method .provided.
Dillaway v. Boston Gaslight Co., 174 Mass. 80, 54 N. E. 359 (1899).
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mortgage, the motives for its exercise cannot be questioned so long as
no abuse of trust to the detriment of minority bondholders appears;
with this limitation, the decision of the majority as to the adequacy of
the reasons for removal is conclusive.' 8 However, a strict construction
is always accorded these provisions.19 Any failure to comply with the
stipulated formalities is likely to prove fatal. 20 But it is unnecessary to
follow the statutory procedure, where one exists, since the trustee is
replaced under the contract of the parties rather than through the ordi-
nary legal machinery.21 Likewise, the appointee will succeed to the
trusteeship without any formal conveyance from his predecessor. 22
Where the mortgage was executed by an individual, some of the earlier
cases have shown a tendency to weaken the effect of the power of
appointment by construing it as personal to the creditor named in the
indenture. It has been held that it is neither assignable with the debt,
2 3
nor delegatable to an agent.2 4 But even where this view has been
adopted the more recent cases show a tendency to construe the instru-
ment so as to avoid its application,2 5 and no such limitations are placed
upon the power when granted to the holders of bonds secured by a
corporate mortgage.26
Removal pursuant to such mortgage provision may be accomplished
without notice to interested persons, even though court approval be the
final step required. The parties by their contract have provided the
remedy, thus rendering the customary legal formalities unnecessary. 27
But where no such provision is found in the mortgage, there must be
some jurisdictional basis for the court to take action in the matter.
Either all the parties concerned must be joined in the litigation, or the
property involved must have been brought within the ambit of the
court's control. In the former case the action is in personam. Mort-
"March v. Romare, 116 Fed. 355 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902).
' TuomPsoN, op. cit. spra note 4, §2668.
'The attempted substitution was held ineffectual in the following cases.
Speers Sand & Clay Works, Inc. v. American Trust Co., 37 F. (2d) 572 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930) ; Griffin v. Haden, 172 Ga. 478, 157 S. E. 686 (1931) ; Equitable Trust
Co. v. Fisher, 106 Ill. 189 (1883) ; James v. James, 260 Mass. 19, 156 N. E. 745
(1927). But cf. Balfour-Guthrie Inv. Co. v. Woodworth, 124 Cal. 169, 56 Pac.
891 (1899) (method of proof of appointment of successor trustee provided in the
mortgage not exclusive) ; Underhill v. Whitney, 88 Colo. 608, 299 Pac. 12 (1931)
(court refused to allow collateral attack by one who was a stranger to the trust).
Raleigh Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Padgett, 194 N. C. 727, 140 S. E. 714
(1927).
- Craft v. Indianapolis, D. & W. Ry. Co., 166 Ill. 580, 46 N. E. 1132 (1897).
Clark v. Wilson, 53 Miss. 119 (1876).
' Watson v. Perkins, 88 Miss. 64, 40 So. 643 (1906). Contra: Michael v.
Crawford, 150 S. W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
West v. Union Naval Stores Co., 117 Miss. 153, 77 So. 961 (1918).
'City Bank & Trust Co. v. Graf, 175 Ga. 340, 165 S. E. 238 (1932).
' Macon & Agusta R. Co. v. Georgia R. Co., 63 Ga. 103 (1879) ; Pillsbury v.
Consolidated E. & N. A. Ry. Co., 69 Me. 394 (1879).
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gagor, trustee, and bondholders, or their representatives, are necessary
parties.28 Here the court has power over the person of the trustee to
compel a transfer by him of his interest in the entire res to his successor.
Where a part of the security is real property located in another juris-
diction the conveyance will be recognized in the courts of its situs. It
is not the decree of the removing court which is being effectuated but
the act of the parties which, though perhaps under judicial duress, is
none the less valid.2 9 But if the trustee be not found within the state,
the court must obtain jurisdiction over the property before it may divest
the trustee of his interest therein. The decree will be in rem, and can-
not operate upon property beyond the state line.30 Once this jurisdic-
tion over the property is acquired, interested parties not otherwise ob-
tainable may be served by publication. 31 Where the trustee's interest
in the security is dubbed "legal title," or "lien," there is little doubt but
that he can be served by publication. However, the situation presented
to the Georgia court is more perplexing. Under the rule prevailing in
that state the trustee has no more than a mere power or agency in regard
to the property, while the legal title to the security is in the 'bond-
holders.32 On this basis it was held that there was nothing before the
'Hidden v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 303 (W. D. Wash. 1914) ;
Inhabitants of Anson v. Somerset R. Co., 85 Me. 79, 26 Atl. 891 (1892) ; Cory v.
Clmstead, 154 Tenn. 513, 290 S. W. 31 (1926).
' Smith v. Davis, 90 Cal. 25, 27 Pac. 26 (1891) ; Poindexter v. Burwell, 82 Va.
507 (1886) ("The doctrine is that if the person to do the act decreed is within
the jurisdiction of the court, and the act may be done without the exercise of any
authority operating territorially within the foreign jurisdiction, the court may act
in personam, and oblige the party to 'convey, or otherwise to comply with its
decree.") ; Penn v. Lord Baltimore 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (Ch. 1750) ; Beale, Equitable
Interests in Foreign Property (1907 20 HARv. f. REV. 382. It has been held that
a court may appoint a receiver and decree foreclosure though the property lies
beyond its jurisdiction. Paget v. Ede, L. R. 18 Eq. 118 (1874). Likewise the
court of one state can order foreclosure of a mortgage upon a railroad which
extends through several states. Craft v. Indianapolis, D. & W. Ry. Co., 166 Ill.
580, 46 N. E. 1132 (1897) ; Union Trust Co. v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. 729, 7 N. E.
822 (1882). But here again it is the conveyance of the parties which is recog-
nized by a foreign court. The decree cannot per se have an extraterritorial effect.
Lynde v. Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 993 (C. C. D. Ind. 1893). Statutes
commonly provide that the court's decree may in certain cases operate as a con-
veyance. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §607. The degree, however, cannot
have the effect of transferring property beyond the jurisdiction of the court 'which
renders it. This must be done by compelling the parties to execute a conveyance.
4 PomER0Y, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919) §§1317, 1318.
"Parker v. Kelley, 166 Fed. 968 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1908); cf. Lindsley v.
O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379 (1888).
" Ketchum v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 2 Woods 532, Fed. Cas. No. 7,737 (C. C. S. D.
Ala. 1876) (trustee served by publication) : State Nat. Bank v. Syndicate Co. of
Eureka Springs, Ark., 178 Fed. 359 (W. D. Ark. 1910) (nonresident bondholders
may be served by publication); Marshall v. Kraak, 23 App. D. C. 129 (1904)
(removal valid even without service by publication where trustee had left the
jurisdiction). But cf. Washington Etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria Etc. R. R. Co., 19
Gratt. 592, 100 Am. Dec. 710 (Va. 1870).
1 See the court's discussion 176 S. E. 384-385.
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court upon which service by publication could be predicated, despite the
fact that the security was Georgia realty. This conclusion is not
altogether without support,3 3 and it follows logically from the premise
if we permit our deductions to lead us through the esoteric technicalities
with which the field of mortgage law is replete. But in this respect
there is no empirical difference between trustees of Georgia and of
North Carolina real estate. In the last analysis what the trustee does
have, whether it be legal title, lien, power, or whatnot, is intimately
associated with the property conveyed as security. The court's control
over the latter should form a basis for publication of service. Mere
names should not alter the situation. Otherwise substantial interests of
bondholders may sometimes be sacrificed for the preservation of this
legal will-o'-the-wisp that is the trustee's interest, an interest that exists
only for the protection of the bondholders, and serious difficulties might
arise should the trustee choose to absent himself at a time when his
services are most necessary.3 4
JOEL B. ADAMS.
Trial Practice-Power of Court to Increase Damages as
Condition to Denial of Motion for New Trial.
A jury in a federal district court awarded the plaintiff $500 damages
for personal injuries caused by the defendant's negligence. On the
plaintiff's motion a new trial was ordered because of inadequacy of
damages unless the defendant consented to increase the verdict to $1500.
The defendant consenting, the motion for new trial was automatically
denied, and the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court of appeals where
the trial court's action was reversed.' Defendant obtained certiorari in
the Supreme Court, which divided five to four in upholding the action
of the intermediate appellate court.
2
Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing the majority opinion, said that the
imposition of such a condition on the denial of a motion for a new trial
violated the plaintiff's right to jury trial, as guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment. He traced the historical development in early English
mayhem cases of the procedure followed by the trial court in this case,
but concluded that those cases had been overruled and were not the
common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. The converse
'Cf. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
" Ordinarily a trustee must obtain court approval in order to free himself from
the trust if he chooses to resign. Under the doctrine of the principal casc, the
Tennessee court would have authority to approve such resignation, since the sit us
of the trust is within its jurisdiction. Cf. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1934).
1 Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
- Dimick v. Schiedt, 55 Sup. Ct. 296 (U. S. 1935).
